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Monetary Policy in New Zealand
During the past five years, New Zealand has
implemented sweeping financial sector deregula-
tion.Thepreceding Letter discusses this change,
which was motivated by a desire to eliminate the
inefficiencies regulation had produced in the
provision of financial services. Deregulation has
also reshaped monetary policy in New Zealand.
This Letter focuses on the changes in New Zea-
land's monetary policy and draws implications
for the U.S. as its financial sector becomes in-
creasingly deregulated.
Monetary policy before deregulation
Prior to July 1984, monetary policy in New
Zealand was clearly subservient to both fiscal
and exchange rate policies. The combination of
reserve asset ratios on commercial banks' port-
folios, pegged interest rates on government debt,
and fixed exchange rates prevented the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand from exercising effective
control over the supply of money.
Reserve asset ratios (RARs), introduced in 1973,
imposed constraints on the asset side of trading
bank balance sheets in the same way reserve
requirements currently do in the United States.
Since government securities, as well as currency
and deposits with the Reserve Bank (called set-
tlement balances) could satisfy the RARs, gov-
ernment deficits automatically increased bank
reserves. This prevented the Reserve Bank from
controlling the level of bank reserves through its
open market operations in government securities.
Monetary policy was also constrained by New
Zealand's policy of pegging interest rates on gov-
ernment debt at below market-clearing levels.
Since the Reserve Bank had to stand ready to
buy and sell government securities at admin-
istratively-set prices, it had no control over the
composition of its own portfolio. Similarly, New
Zealand's exchange rate policy required the Re-
serve Bank to buy and sell foreign exchange at
the pegged exchange rate, further reducing New
Zealand's ability to exercise independent mone-
tary control.
Without an effective, independent monetary
policy, it is not surprising that New Zealand's
rate of inflation averaged over 12 percent per
year between 1979 and 1983, even though wage
and price controls reduced the measured rate of
inflation below four percent in 1983. Duringthis
period of high inflation, many called for greater
effective control over the economy's supply of
money. Effective monetary control, in turn, re-
quired changes in the financial system and in the
policies governing exchange rates and the gov-
ernment's fiscal operations.
Monetary policy after deregulation
The financial reforms instituted since 1984 have
allowed the Reserve Bank of New Zealand to
control the reserves of the banking sector. By
instituting a floating exchange rate and by selling
government securities on an auction basis, the
Reserve Bank is no longer required to increase
the reserve base in support of pegged rates. In
addition, the entire system of required reserve
asset ratios was dismantled.
Now, monetary policy focuses on two different
monetary aggregates. The first comprises bank
settlement balances on deposit with the Reserve
Bank. The second, called primary liquidity (PL),
comprises settlement balances plus government
securities with less than one month remaining to
maturity. The Reserve Bank establishes target
levels for each of these aggregates. Open market
operations are then conducted in order to
achieve the targeted levels.
Despite the elimination of reserve asset ratios,
banks continue to hold settlement balances since
these balances are the only asset accepted by the
Reserve Bank for settling transactions between
the government and the private sector. Since
banks cannot perfectly forecast their daily net
transactions with the government, they choose to
hold positive settlement balances on average to
be able to meet random fluctuations in the vol-
ume of their transactions. If a bank does find
itself with insufficient settlement balances at theFRBSF
Another difference between the u.s. and New
Zealand is that the Reserve Bank's target for pri-
mary liquidity imposes a ceiling on total reserves
since government securities counted as part of PL
are the only securities that can be discounted at
the Reserve Bank and the supply of these securi-
ties is limited. In contrast, the Federal Reserve
does not impose an explicit ceiling on the
amount of borrowing it will allow.
of New Zealand imposes a penalty rate on dis-
count borrowing, producing an interest-inelastic
reserve supply. While daily rate volatility has
increased, monthly observations on interest rates
in New Zealand two years before and after finan-
cial reform was initiated in July 1984 show that
rates were no more volatile after the change than
before, even though the posHeforrn tontraction-
ary policy raised rates to very high levels. (See
Chart.)
Finally, New Zealand's policy is not subject to
the problems associated with lagged reserve
requirements, as the Federal Reserve's procedure
was. Lagged reserve accounting, it was argued,
weakens the link between the current supply of
bank reserves and bank deposits, thereby weak-
ening the Fed's ability to control the broader
monetary aggregates through a nonborrowed
reserves operating procedure. In New Zealand,
reserve requirements were set equal to zero, in















Interest Rates in New Zealand
and the United States
Acomparison with the u.s.
New Zealand's policy resembles the nonbor-
rowed reserves operating procedure the Federal
Reserve employed in the United States between
October 1979 and late 1982. Cash settlement
balances in New Zealand correspond to nonbor-
rowed reserves in the U.S. and the Reserve Bank's
practice of discounting eligible government se-
curities is analogous to borrowing from the
Federal 'Reserve's discount window at a penalty
rate.
There are several important differences between
the two policies, however. First, unlike New Zea-
land's Reserve Bank, the.Federal Reserve gener-
ally did not (and still does not) impose a penalty
borrowing rate. This created an incentive for
banks in the u.s. to borrow, but banks also faced
non-price restrictions on the frequency with
which they could borrow. Many analysts argued
that the Fed could have achieved better control
over the broader monetary aggregates by setting
the discount rate above the federal funds rate.
Such a penalty rate would have discouraged
banks from borrowing from the Fed, but many
worried that such a policy also would have in-
creased interest rate volatility since the supply of
reserves would have been inelastic.
end of a da'iJ it attempts to borrow excess settle-
ment balances in the interbank market (essen-
tially equivalent to the federal funds market in
the U.s.). Alternatively, it can borrow from the
Reserve Bank by selling some of its holdings of
government securities at a discount. Since the
discount established by the Reserve Bank is be-
low the marketprice, this option amounts to
borrowing at a penalty rate.
The Reserve Bank determines the aggregate
supply of cash settlementbalances (that is, set-
tlement balances that have not been borrowed
from the Reserve Bank) through its open market
operations. When aggregate demand for cash set-
tlement balances exceeds the level supplied by
the Reserve Bank, banks must obtain additional
cash by borrowing from the Reserve Bank. More-
over, since only securities with less than one
month to maturity can be discounted, the supply
of PUimits aggregate borrowing.
New Zealand's experience provides a useful
counterpoint to this concern. The Reserve Bank
JLessons for the u.s.
In 1982, the Fed shifted away from its nonbor-
rowed reserves policy because of uncertainty
over the link between the monetary aggregates
and nominal income. Even though New Zea-
land's current policy resembles an approach the
Fed has rejected, New Zealand's experience still
holds some lessons for the U.S., particularly in
the debate over reserve requirements. Reserve
requirements forceaffected institutions to hold
non-interest bearing cash or deposits at the Fed-
eral Reserve. The interest income these institu-
tions must forego by holding these non-interest
bearing assets amounts to a direct tax on their
activities. Since reserve requirements are typ-
ically imposed on some financial institutions but
not on others that may nonetheless be engaged
in very similar types of activities, regulatory dis-
tinctions will influence the portfolio choices of
individuals. Moreover, such a tax on the institu-
tions that offer transactions accounts tends to
reduce the level of financial intermediation serv-
ices provided by these institutions, even though
they may be the most efficient providers of such
services.
Traditionally, economists have argued that a sys-
tem of reserve requirements is necessary because
it enhances the ability to control the money sup-
ply and the rate of inflation. The Federal Reserve
can control the supply of bank reserves, but un-
less there is a well-defined demand for reserves,
controlling reserves will not give the Fed control
over the broader monetary aggregates and eco-
nomic activity. A system of reserve requirements
generates the needed link between the demand
for the monetary aggregates and demand for non-
interest bearing bank reserves.
However, the New Zealand experience rein-
forces recent theoretical arguments that reserve
requirements are not necessary for the conduct
of monetary policy (see Letter of 8/22/86). The
Reserve Bank has found that the demand for re-
serves has remained well defined even after the
elimination of all reserve requirements.
The key factor insuring a demand for reserves
appears to be the requirement that transactions
with the government be settled with bank settle-
ment balances and that these balances be non-
negative at the close of each business day. This
means that banks need to hold an average level
of reserves that is high enough to avoid facing
unanticipated cash outflows during the day in
excess of their reserve balances. Because the
Reserve Bank does not permit the banking sys-
tem as a whole to have a negative net reserve
position, a minimum is established for reserve
holdings. Legal reserve requirements merely
force this minimum to a higher level and, by
linking reserves and monetary aggregates, tie
together money supply control and inflation
control.
Although legal reserve requirements are not
necessary to generate a demand for reserves, pre-
sumably, the Reserve Bank could alter demand
through the payment of interest on reserves. Cur-
rently, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand sets the
interest rate on bank reserves at two-thirds the
7-day call money rate. The gap between these
two rates represents the opportunity cost to
banks of holding reserves. While this gap has not
been used in New Zealand to actively influence
the demand for reserves, the interest rate paid on
reserves certainly represents a potential policy
tool-for the U.S., as well as for New Zealand.
Perhaps the most useful lesson to be drawn from
the experience of New Zealand is that the elim-
ination of reserve requirements necessitates only
minor adjustments in the conduct of monetary
policy. Since legal reserve requirements seem
largely unnecessary from the perspective of mon-
tary policy and their elimination does not require
drastic changes in the implementation of policy,
proponents of reserve requirements need to artic-
ulate why a tax, the sole purpose of which seems
to be to raise revenue, should be imposed on
bank borrowers and depositors, but not on non-
bank borrowers and depositors.
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